This paper studies the effect of credit scoring by banks on bank lending to small businesses by addressing the following questions: does credit scoring increase or decrease the propensity of banks to grant credit? Does it improve the selection of borrowers? Does credit scoring improve or reduce the likelihood that a borrower defaults on its loan? We answer these questions using a unique dataset that collects data from both a targeted survey on credit scoring models and the Central Credit Register. We rely on instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of credit scoring. We find that credit scoring does not change the propensity of banks to grant loans to the generality of borrowers but helps them select borrowers. We also find that credit scoring reduces the likelihood that a borrower defaults, in particular for smaller borrowers and for banks that declare to use credit scoring mainly as a tool to monitor borrowers. These results are homogeneous across bank characteristics such as size, capital, and profitability. Overall our results suggest that credit scoring has a positive effect on the selection of borrowers and on credit performance. JEL Classification: G21.
Introduction 1
A crucial role played by banks is the ecient use of information to screen and monitor borrowers.
In particular, banks use dierent lending technologies characterized by the relative importance of hard and soft information (Berger and Udell, 2002) . Advances in information and communication technology, more adapt at transmitting and processing information, and competitive pressure, which pushes banks to compress costs, have increased incentives and opportunities for employing lending technologies which rely more intensively on hard information (Petersen, 2004) . Among these, credit scoring, which involves the standardization of information in the form of a credit score, represents a key example of hardening of soft information used to screen and monitor borrowers.
As a consequence, the adoption of credit scoring may have large eects on the way banks originate and monitor loans, and in turn on credit supply and the default rates of borrowers.
First, the availability of additional (possibly more precise) information may induce banks to lend more and to better assess borrowers' creditworthiness (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001; Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005) . Second, the adoption of credit scoring can generate cost savings to the extent that the information produced by scoring models substitutes the collection of soft information by local branch managers (see, among others, Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005) . In this case, the adoption of credit scoring may allow banks to lower rates, granting credit to previously marginal borrowers, which may end up defaulting more. Third, if the quantitative information provided by credit scoring models substitutes the soft information traditionally collected by loan ocers, banks can stop lending to borrowers for which the quantitative information needed for scoring models is not available. Finally, the standardization of credit allowed by the adoption of credit scoring is a prerequisite for securitization (Temkin and Kormendi, 2003) . This can aect credit standards to the extent that securitized loans are riskier than loans that are not securitized (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig, 2010) . This paper sheds light on these issues by addressing the following questions: does the adoption of credit scoring aect the propensity of banks to grant a loan? Does the adoption of credit scoring aect the propensity of banks to grant a loan to ex-ante riskier borrowers? Does the adoption of credit scoring aect the likelihood that a borrower defaults on its loans? We an-1 We are grateful to Scott Frame, Matteo Piazza, Andrea Polo, seminar participants at the Bank of Italy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. All errors are our own. The views expressed in this paper are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Bank of Italy or of the Eurosystem. 5 swer these questions using a unique dataset based on a survey on the adoption of credit scoring models by Italian banks matched with the Italian credit register, which provides information on individual loan applications and on the status (performing or non-performing) of loans granted by Italian banks. Our data cover loans to small businesses. This is important because: i) credit scoring models are mostly used for lending to small rms and households; ii) the market of loans to small rms is especially relevant, as these rms represent about 70 per cent of value added in Italy; iii) small rms are dependent on banks for outside nance, so studying bank loans implies studying their overall access to external nance.
We nd that the adoption of credit scoring does not change the propensity of banks to grant loans to the generality of borrowers, but it allows banks to select safer borrowers. We also nd that the adoption of credit scoring reduces the likelihood that a borrower defaults. These results are homogeneous across bank characteristics such as size, capital, protability. The eect of the adoption of credit scoring in reducing the probability that a loan defaults is stronger for banks that declare to use credit scoring mainly as a tool to monitor borrowers and for smaller borrowers.
We interpret these results as suggesting that the quantitative information provided by credit scoring helps banks to monitor borrowers after the loan is originated, allowing them to better manage the lending relationships, in this way reducing the likelihood the borrower defaults. In fact, the application of credit scoring to monitor the evolution of borrowers' creditworthiness and of lending relationships allows risk management practices based on hard information, which facilitate the decisions taken by loan ocers about loans already granted, particularly inside complex banking organizations (Stein, 2002) .
Studying the eects of the adoption of credit scoring on lending and borrower quality poses several identication challenges. First, banks adopting credit scoring may be dierent from banks not adopting credit scoring, and the dierence may not be captured by observable bank variables. Second, the timing of adoption may reect developments in the loan portfolio of banks: for example, banks may decide to adopt credit scoring because they face an increase in the default rate of their borrowers. We address these identication challenges using a dierencein-dierence model which includes bank xed eects and in which we instrument the decision to adopt credit scoring for small businesses with the decision to adopt credit scoring for loans to households 2 or more years before. Hence, our model compares the probability of accepting loan applications and the probability of default of individual loans of banks adopting credit scoring with those of banks not adopting credit scoring, controlling for all bank observable and 6 unobservable characteristics thanks to the inclusion of bank xed eects. The instrument takes care of the potential endogeneity of the timing of adoption, and it is based on the observation that the adoption of credit scoring for loans to household typically precedes the adoption for small business loans, since the former are more standardized (Mester, 1997) . The fullment of the exclusion restriction is plausible, because the adoption of credit scoring in the household loan market reasonably has no eect on the supply of loans in the small business loan market since the two markets are segmented.
Our ndings contribute to the literature in several ways. Early works focus on the eect of the adoption of credit scoring on the growth of loans. Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001) study the eect of adopting credit scoring on lending in a simultaneous equations model which accounts for the endogeneity of credit scoring adoption. They nd that credit scoring adoption increases lending to small businesses. Frame, Padhi and Woosley (2004) nd that the increase in lending following the adoption of credit scoring is more pronounced in low and moderate income areas. Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) extend the previous results and also study the impact of the adoption of credit scoring on credit quality; they nd that after the adoption of credit scoring banks increase lending and credit quality deteriorates. De Young, Glennon and Nigro (2008) show that credit scoring is associated with higher default probabilities; they explain this result with the production eciencies related to the use of credit scoring, which would encourage adopters to expand output by making riskier loans at the margin. Berger, Cowan and Frame (2011) show no change in the quality of the loan portfolio for community banks. Hasumi, Hirata and Ono (2011) nd that the ex-post probability of default of small rms increases after nonprimary banks adopted credit scoring; they nd the opposite result if the bank adopting credit scoring is the main lender.
The eects of small business credit scoring (from now on SBCS) appear to dier markedly depending on how a bank implements the technology. In particular, dierent eects could depend on the importance credit scoring does have in the decision to grant credit: if it is used automatically and it is the main factor inuencing that decision (rules) or if it is just one ingredient among others (discretion). According to Berger, Frame, Miller (2005) for rules banks SBCS is associated with more lending, higher prices, and greater loan risk. By contrast, for discretion banks they nd no statistically signicant increase in credit availability, larger increases in loan prices relative to rules banks, and diminished loan risk. These results suggest that when SBCS is used as complement to another lending technology, lending costs may be increased, but the improved accuracy in credit evaluation may reduce risk.
All the previous works use data aggregated at the bank level and treat at dierent depth the issue of the endogeneity of credit scoring adoption. We complement and extend these ndings by using detailed data at the loan level. This is useful for at least two reasons: rst, it allows us to control for industry and location of the borrower, which are potential important determinants of both credit supply and credit quality; second, it allows us to use the probability that a loan application is granted as a measure of credit supply, which is a better measure than the volume of loans granted, in that it is less aected by demand factors (Jimenez et al. 2014) . Moreover, we account for the potential endogeneity of credit scoring adoption. Other works do not fully control for this relevant issue, with the exception of Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001) , who do not study the eect of credit scoring adoption on credit quality. Finally, we also provide rst evidence on the channels (screening versus monitoring) through which credit scoring aects lending and credit quality. Concerning the empirical strategy, our paper is strictly related to Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2013) who use data from a seller of used cars to study how the adoption of credit scoring aects loan origination, loan terms, and default rates. The adoption is randomized across dierent selling outlets of the same company to account for endogeneity.
They nd that after adoption the lender rations riskier borrowers more through tightening the terms of the loan, and that default rates drop signicantly. The dierence between our results and those of the prior works may be due to our focus on a dierent country than the US or Japan, but they could also reect the use of a dierent, more robust, identication strategy.
More broadly, our work contributes to the literature on the consequences of the interaction between hard and soft information when banks use credit scoring. Brown, Schaller, Westerfeld and Heusler (2012) show that loan ocers use their autonomy in over-riding scoring models more frequently when the borrower has a tighter credit relationship with the bank. Brown, Degryse, Hower, and Penas (2012) show that banks' use of external credit scores do aect the availability of credit for start-up rms, but that banks rely less on external rating information in their decision making for high-tech start-ups than low-tech start-ups. Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011) nd that the use of discretion on loan rate setting in small business lending decreased over time, consistently with a higher use of hard information made possible by the increased adoption of scoring techniques. Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) show that sharing of hard information implies higher benet from investing in the soft information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the adoption and usage of 8 credit scoring by Italian banks; section 3 describes the data; section 4 discusses the identication strategy; section 5 presents the results; section 6 concludes.
The Adoption and Usage of Credit Scoring
The pattern of diusion of credit scoring diers according to the characteristics of banks and borrowers. Usually credit scoring is adopted for loans of small amount, for which the unit costs of collecting information are very high, or for standardized loans. In fact, credit scoring was rstly adopted in the US for consumer credit; subsequently it has been used for mortgages and small business loans (Mester, 1997) . Large banks with broad networks of branches which can fully exploit scale economies usually adopt credit scoring earlier.
We collect data on the adoption and usage of credit scoring from a survey of commercial small business lending (see Del Prete, Pagnini, Rossi and Vacca, 2013) . The adoption of credit scoring models for assessing households' creditworthiness has generally preceded their adoption for small business lending. According to the survey, both weighted and unweighted frequencies of banks adopting credit scoring models for granting credit to households are always higher than for granting credit to rms (see Rossi, 2008) . The adoption of credit scoring was not uniform across banks: adoption is higher among larger banks whose extensive networks of branches allow them to exploit economies of scale (Bofondi and Lotti, 2005) .
Credit scoring models may be internally developed, or acquired by external providers. As of December 2006, more than 50 per cent of the banks that had introduced credit scoring models had participated actively in their development, either alone or in cooperation with other institutions. The survey also contains data on what information feeds the scoring models in the case of small business lending. Mutual and small banks report that the most important information is the nancial statement, followed by the credit history of rms with the bank and with the rest of the banking system. 3 Larger banks, by contrast, assign greater importance to the rm's past credit performance than to its accounting data.
As mentioned in the introduction, the eect of credit scoring on lending and on the selection of borrowers also depends on its degree of complementarity with other lending technologies: if it is used automatically for granting credit (rules) or if it is just a complementary lending technology with respect to others (discretion; see, among the others, Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005) .
According to the survey, credit scoring models play a key role in the decision whether or not to grant a loan. Apart from mutual banks, the percentage of the other types of banks for which the score is decisive or very important is above 50 per cent (Figure 2 ). 4 The relative importance of quantitative techniques is denitely greater among larger banks and decreases with bank size. For loans to SMEs, scoring models are assigned high importance more frequently by larger banks, less frequently by smaller ones, while mutual banks report they assign high importance to qualitative information, too. Credit scoring models are rarely employed to set interest rates and loan maturities ( Figure 3 ). By contrast, they are widely used to monitor the situation of rms, both large and small, and the status of loans and accounts.
3 In the survey, the question on this matter was phrased in ordinal terms, asking respondents to rank the various pieces of information feeding the scoring models by importance (see the appendix). we obtain a measure of loan application acceptance in a given time window (as in Jimenez et al. 2014) .
Bank balance sheet data are from the Supervisory Reports submitted by banks to the Bank of Italy, the banking supervisor in the country.
The sample
As a rst step to build the dataset we have identied the years with the highest adoption rate by banks. These turn out to be 2003, 2004 and 2005 , for a total of 85 banks adopting SBCS.
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These are the treated banks, while the control group is composed of all the banks included in the survey which haven't adopted SBCS in the sample period (126 banks). Overall, our sample includes 211 banks.
The construction of the sample aims at obtaining a dataset which can be used for both the loan acceptance and the credit performance analysis.
For the sample used to study the eect of the adoption of credit scoring on credit performance (probability of default) the dataset includes small rms which accessed the credit market for the rst time (cohorts). The use of cohorts allows a better assessment of the evolution of credit relationships, which are followed since their beginning; besides that, the monitoring of borrowers is less inuenced by the information shared in the Credit Register, which refers to rms which have already accessed the credit market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Padilla and Pagano, 1997) ;
for this reason the assessment of rms' creditworthiness is more relevant and as a consequence the impact of the introduction of SBCS could be higher. The sample also includes information on the status of the loans (default or not) during the three years after they are granted. The choice of this time period is based on the observation that for Italian banks on average most of the defaults happen during the rst three years of the credit relationship. The sample used to analyze the eect of the adoption of credit scoring on the acceptance of loans includes all the applications from small rms, both from rms which had already been granted credit in previous periods from other banks, and from rms which entered the credit market for the rst time, so that credit history was not available for these rms. The inclusion of the former, not included in the sample used for the analysis of credit performance, is necessary to identify riskier borrowers (see below). In particular, in the analysis of riskier borrowers we focus only on rms that have been in the Credit Register for at least 1 year precisely to ensure that some credit history on them was available to identify those having some past-due loans.
We select small rms applying for credit using the same structure as for the credit performance analysis (see above): i.e. for a bank adopting SBCS in 2004, we select applicants in 2000 and
2005. We then check in the CR whether the applicant was granted credit within 3 months of the application date. For computational reasons, the dataset includes a random sample of all small rms included in the CR, based on the CR borrower code (we choose rms whose last digit of the CR code is either 4 or 9).
Overall, the dataset used for the credit performance analysis contains data on about 20,000 credit relationships; the one used for the loan application analysis contains data on almost 6 See the on-line Bank of Italy Statistical Database, Table TDB30540 (Historical default rates for borrower cohorts).
250,000 credit relationships. The two datasets don't include exactly the same rms. The reason is that rms that are not granted credit are not in the credit performance analysis. Moreover, some rms that are included in the credit performance analysis do not appear in the loan applications dataset because banks chose not to check the applicant status in the CR.
We nd
an overlap for about 10,000 relationships (7,600 rms).
Description of the variables
To assess the impact of the adoption of credit scoring on banks' decision to grant loans we introduce a dummy variable based on the information contained in the CR concerning loan applications by rms. The dummy variable is equal to one if the loan application has been accepted in the subsequent 3 months, 0 otherwise. We also dene a similar variable to study the decision to grant a loan to ex-ante riskier borrowers. In this case we construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if the loan application posted by a borrower which recorded non-performing loans in the prior two years has been accepted in the subsequent 3 months, 0 otherwise.
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The dependent variable for the analysis of the eect of SBCS adoption on credit performance is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit granted to a single rm defaults during the three years after the beginning of the relationship.
The main explanatory variable concerns the use of SBCS, constructed on the basis of the answers reported by the banks participating to the survey.
9 In particular, we dene a dummy variable equal to one if the bank reports that it has adopted SBCS in 2003, 2004, or 2005. In some regressions we also include relationship-specic and bank balance-sheet controls.
The log of the volume of credit committed measures the exposure of the bank to each rm at the beginning of the credit relationship. The strength of the relationship is measured by the number of lenders at its beginning. As highlighted in the introduction, the adoption of credit scoring techniques can be related to the securitization of loans, sometimes concerning nonperforming loans. Therefore, we introduce a dummy variable which identies the securitizied 7 Checking rms' status in the CR is not compulsory, and banks may decide to dispense with it, especially if the rm is very small and if the applicant declares that it was the rst time she applied for credit, as it is the case with the rms included in the dataset for credit performance analysis.
8 In this case the sample only includes rms that were already recorded in the CR before, so that they had a credit history.
9
The reliability of the answer to this question is supported by multiple pieces of evidence: the lending process by Italian banks is guided by credit manuals (guidelines for loan ocers) in which the use of SBCS is explicitly envisaged. The amount of loans which can be granted in autonomy by each loan ocer is linked to the results of the application of SBCS. The electronic procedure which governs the lending process envisages procedural blocks which activate if a loan has not been previously evaluated by the SBCS.
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loans; in particular, the dummy variable is equal to one if at least part of the loan granted to a rm has been securitized during the 3 years after the establishment of the credit relationship.
Finally, bank balance-sheet variables include capital, total prot, all scaled by total assets, and the geographical concentration of deposits.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
We start showing descriptive statistics of the main variables used to proxy for credit supply and credit quality (Table 1 ). In particular, the mean of the dummy for the acceptance of loans in the post-adoption period (2004, 2005, 2006 ) is slightly larger than in the pre-adoption period (1999, 2000, 2001) for adopters, while it is smaller for non-adopters (column 1 of Table 1 ). The mean of the dummy for the acceptance of applications by riskier borrowers is higher in the post-adoption period for both adopters and non-adopters. Default rates after the adoption of SBCS decrease slightly for adopters, while they increase for non-adopters.
While this aggregate evidence suggests that the dierences between adopters and nonadopters are somewhat limited, it does not take into account the potential endogeneity of the adoption decision, or dierences in industry and geographical location of borrowers, which are likely to matter in the regression analysis.
Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics in the period before the adoption of SBCS show that the only statistically signicant dierence between adopters and non-adopters concerns size:
adopters are on average larger (Table 2 ). Other bank balance-sheet variables like capital and total prot, scaled by assets, and geographical concentration of deposits do not dier statistically between adopters and non adopters in the period before adoption. This evidence supports the hypothesis that non-adopters are a valid counterfactual for adopters.
Statistics on borrowers (Table 3) show that these are mainly located in the Northern regions and operate mainly in retail, manufacturing and construction; more than half of the sample rms are sole proprietorships. Loan size is on average 109,000 Euros, the median is about 88,000. This indicates that we are covering a sample of small, but not micro rms. These are not included in the sample due to the reporting threshold of the Credit Register, set at 75,000 Euros during our sample period.
10 This variable captures the extent to which a bank concentrate its activity in a few provinces.
4 Empirical Strategy
To assess the eect of the adoption of SBCS on credit supply and on the probability that a borrower defaults, we estimate the following model:
where y ibt is the outcome variable, alternatively: i) a dummy variable equal to one if bank b accepts a loan application from borrower i in year t; ii) a dummy variable equal to one if bank b accepts a loan application from a risky borrower i in year t; iii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if borrower i obtaining a loan by bank b in year t defaults on the loan within the following three years.
The key explanatory variable is CreditScoring b * P ost t , the interaction term between the dummy variable identifying banks which have adopted SBCS in the period 2003-2005 (C reditScoring b ) and the dummy variable which identies the period after the year of adoption of SBCS (P ost t ).
We also include a full set of year dummies, λ t , that capture business cycle eects and of bank dummies, γ b , which control for systematic dierences across banks, including, importantly, bank specic (time invariant) factors aecting credit supply, as well as the initial condition of the loan portfolio. Finally, we include xed eects for the industry and province of residence of borrowers, and for borrower size classes (single proprietorships and partnerships below 5 employees, between 5 and 20, above 20, further distinguished into craftsmen and others; craftsmen, such as carpenters, locksmiths, etc. are identied separately as they may obtain credit at special conditions). We don't include rm xed eects because our sample covers only small rms; for each of them there exist only very few applications in our sample; in particular, observations concerning rms which apply for both adopters and non adopters (necessary for identication) amount to 19 per cent of the total.
The identication of the coecient of the eect of the adoption of credit scoring (Credit Scoring*Post), β, is based on a dierence-in-dierence approach in which we instrument the adoption of credit scoring. We compare the change in the outcome variable for adopting banks before and after adoption with the change in the outcome variable of non-adopting banks before and after the adoption, conditional on all controls. The coecient β identies the causal eect of the adoption of credit scoring on loan application acceptances/credit performance only if certain conditions are fullled. First, the decision of banks to adopt credit scoring may be endogenous. Despite the presence of bank xed eects, the timing of adoption may depend upon some bank time-varying unobservable characteristics. To address this issue we instrument the dummy CreditScoring using a dummy which equals one if the bank was already adopting credit scoring models for consumer loans or household mortgages at least 2 years before the reference date. The instrument is based on the idea that banks that already adopted credit scoring techniques for mortgages and consumer credit gained useful experience which makes them more likely to extend the usage to SBCS. As shown in section 2, banks usually adopt credit scoring for standardized loans such as mortgages and consumer credit rst, and later extend it to small business loans. Our identication hypothesis holds conditional on bank xed eects, and thus on bank time-invariant characteristics such as initial composition and quality of the loan portfolio, geographical scope and specialization. Table 4 shows the distribution of the dummy adopters and of the instrument. Overall, 30 banks out of 85 adopted credit scoring for consumer loans and mortgages at least 2 years prior of the adoption for small business loans.
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Second, banks that don't adopt credit scoring should represent a good counterfactual for banks that adopt. We argue that this is the case since the main dierence across adopters and non-adopters is size (Table 2 ). Once size is taken into account, adopters have similar protability and capital as non-adopters. Then, since we also control for the log of bank assets, we are able to control for systematic dierences in size across adopters and non-adopters.
Third, the adoption of credit scoring for consumer loans and mortgages should not have a direct eect on small business lending (exclusion restriction). A potential violation of this condition could occur if an easier access to mortgages allows small entrepreneurs to buy a home and this provides good collateral for small business loans. There is no evidence of this phenomenon in the data: gure 4 shows that the dynamics of mortgages is not dierent for banks adopting and not adopting SBCS. Moreover, an overall exposure of 75,000 Euros towards the same bank is the condition for a rm to be included in the Credit Register in our sample period. This implies that our sample includes small but not micro-rms (see the average and median loan size in Table 3 ); for this reason the use of personal wealth such as housing is not likely as the rms included in our sample will have other assets pledgeable as collateral.
Furthermore, home equity extraction instruments were (and still are) not available in the Italian market, which limits the extent to which entrepreneurs can use housing wealth to obtain loans 11 Identication in dierence in dierence models requires that the dependent variable follows a common trend before adoption (the event or shock) across adopters and non-adopters (the treated and control group, respectively). This condition is satised provided that the instrument is a valid instrument.
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for their business.
Finally, the decision to adopt credit scoring should not create spillovers on non-adopters.
For example, banks adopting credit scoring may better select borrowers, and as a consequence non-adopters face a higher proportion of lower quality borrowers (or vice-versa). We take care of this possibility controlling for province*time xed eects to capture changes in the conditions of local credit markets over time, including possible changes in the proportion of low quality borrowers applying for loans to non-adopters in a local credit market. We assume that the relevant local credit market is a province. This is reasonable since local credit markets in Italy for SMEs can be dened at the province-level (Banca d'Italia, 1992; Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006; Gobbi and Lotti, 2005) .
Results

Adoption of SBCS and probability of accepting a loan application
We start showing the results of the regressions on the probability a loan application is granted.
We estimate equation (1) The specication also includes xed eects for banks, provinces in which rms are located, rms' size classes, rms' industry and time xed eects (for the year in which the loan application has been posted). In all regressions we cluster standard errors at the bank level. OLS estimates show that the adoption of credit scoring has a positive eect on the probability of acceptance of loan applications by the generality of borrowers; the result concerning the riskier borrowers is not statistically signicant (table 12) .
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show 2SLS estimates of the baseline model. The rst stage has the expected sign and is highly statistically signicant: banks which have adopted credit scoring for loans to households since at least two years are more likely to adopt credit scoring for small business lending. The second stage, shown in column 1, indicates that after the adoption of SBCS the probability of accepting a loan application has not changed signicantly: the coecient of the interaction between the dummy CreditScoring and the dummy Post is negative, but not 12 Non-performing loans include bad loans and restructured loans.
signicant (p-value 0.32). By contrast, the adoption of SBCS has a negative and signicant eect on the probability that a loan application posted by riskier borrowers is accepted; this drops by about 1.8 percentage points after the bank starts using credit scoring. The eect is also economically signicant, as the average probability of accepting a loan application from a riskier borrower is 5%, so that the adoption of SBCS reduces it by more than one third.
Columns 3 and 4 show the results of the regressions including province*time xed eects, which control for province specic trends in business cycle and also for changes in local market conditions (and thus for potential spillovers from banks adopting credit scoring to banks not adopting). Interestingly, the estimated eect of credit scoring is unchanged and the size of the coecients is very similar to the baseline. Finally, columns 5 and 6 show regressions including bank balance sheet controls and results are analogous to those of the baseline regression.
Overall these results indicate that the introduction of SBCS has not led banks to relax credit standards. First, the propensity to grant loans to the average applicant does not seem to be aected by the adoption of SBCS. Second, banks seem to be less willing to grant loans to borrowers that had non-performing loans in the past, arguably riskier borrowers. These results suggest that the adoption of SBCS helps banks to become more selective in their lending policy.
Adoption of SBCS and credit performance
We now turn to exploring whether the adoption of SBCS aects credit quality. We measure credit quality by the probability that a borrower defaults within 3 years since the beginning of the credit relationship (see par. 3.3).
A priori the eect of the adoption and use of SBCS on credit performance is not obvious.
The adoption of SBCS could just entail a lowering of operating costs and the granting of loans to marginal clients characterized by higher risk, thus causing a worsening of credit performance; dierently, the adoption of SBCS can improve the accuracy in the evaluation of rms' creditworthiness, resulting in a better credit performance. The results from the previous section suggest that the selectivity of banks does not decrease after the adoption of SBCS, and if anything it even increases.
According to the OLS estimate the adoption of SBCS causes a decrease in the probability of default of the loans granted to rms which for the rst time have accessed the credit system, but the result is not statistically signicant (table 12) . The results of the 2SLS estimates are shown in Table 6 and indicate that the adoption of SBCS has a positive eect on credit performance.
13
The rst stage has the expected sign and is highly statistically signicant: banks adopting credit scoring for loans to households in the prior two years are more likely to adopt credit scoring for small business lending. The coecient of the interaction term CreditScoring*Post is negative and statistically signicant (column 1). The eect is sizable: the probability of loan defaulting within three years after the establishment of the credit relationship decreases by 2.8 percentage points after a bank adopts SBCS, and the average share of loans defaulting within three years in the post adoption period is 2.5% (with a standard deviation of 15%). This result is robust to several checks. Column 2 shows estimates including loan-level and rm-level controls: the size of the granted loan, a dummy for whether the loan was securitized and the number of bank relationships. The initial size of the loan has no eect on the probability of defaulting.
Interestingly, the dummy for securitized loans is negative and signicant, suggesting that loans that are securitized are less likely to default.
14 Finally, the initial number of bank relationships is associated with a higher probability of defaulting within 3 years.
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Column 3 shows estimates of the main regression including province*time xed eects, and results are unchanged. Finally, column 4 shows estimates of the main regression including banklevel controls. Again, CreditScoring*Post has a negative and signicant coecient. Importantly, the estimated eect of the adoption of SBCS is very similar in size across specications, suggesting a low correlation with borrower and bank characteristics.
The overlapping sample
As discussed in Section 3, the rms included in the two samples used respectively for the loan acceptance and the credit performance analyses are not the same. This is mainly due to the fact that the sample for the analysis of credit performance only includes rms which access for the rst time the credit system (cohorts), while the sample for the loan acceptance analysis also includes rms which had already been granted credit in the previous periods. Besides that, not all the rms which have requested credit (included in the loan acceptance sample) do succeed in accessing the credit market. Finally, banks don't request information to the CR for all the rms 13 Again, regressions include bank xed eects, industry, province, size class, and year (this corresponds to the cohort, i.e. the year in which the rm rst entered the Credit Register and started the relationship with the bank) xed eects.
which apply for credit, especially if they demand credit for the rst time. For these reasons the overlapping sample includes around 7,600 rms for about 10,100 observations (for the loan acceptance analysis).
We perform the estimate of the benchmark equation for both the loan acceptance and the credit performance on the rms included in both samples (overlapping sample). The results indicate that the adoption of SBCS doesn't aect the probability of granting credit to small rms:
the sign of the coecient related to the generality of borrowers is numerically very close to that of the benchmark equations, but it is not statistically signicant (table 7) .
16 The adoption of SBCS does still lower the probability that a borrower defaults; the eect is slightly stronger than that associated to the whole sample.
Overall the results of the estimates on the overlapping sample mainly conrm those discussed in the previous paragraphs.
Extensions
In this section we test whether the eects of the adoption of SBCS described so far are heterogeneous across banks and borrowers. Tables 8 and 9 show results of 2SLS estimates of the baseline model including interactions between the dummy CreditScoring, the dummy Post and dummies for bank characteristics. These are: size, capital, protability, the concentration of deposits of the bank across provinces, all measured as of the year before the reference year.
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The size of banks can be considered a proxy for lending technologies in the pre-adoption period; in particular, a small size can be associated with the relationship lending technology, and a large size with other technologies. 18 We use dummies to identify small/large banks, banks with high/low capital, high/low ROA, high/low concentration of deposits, and interact these dummies with the interaction CreditScoring*Post. Results indicate that the eect of SBCS is mostly homogeneous across bank characteristics both for the loan acceptance ( 17 If the outcome (acceptance or probability of defaulting in the following three years) refers to 1999, the bank-level variables are measured as of the end of 1998, and so on.
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The eects of the use of SBCS can be dierent according to the type of lending technology adopted by the single banks in the period preceding the adoption of SBCS. We can hypothesize that the adoption of SBCS has a stronger eect on the lending process if in the previous period the bank adopted a relationship lending Next, we turn to test whether the eect of SBCS varies according to characteristics of the borrower. Unfortunately, our sample does not allow us to merge the identity of the borrower with her balance sheet information, so we can exploit a few borrower characteristics. One of the most important is size. As a proxy for the size of the borrower we use the size of the loan, because it is a more detailed measure of size than the size classes used to construct the set of dummies included in the regressions. The lack of information on borrower balance sheet also implies that we cannot run this test on the data for the acceptance of loan applications, since we only observe loan size when a loan is granted.
Results are shown in Table 10 . Column 1 contains an interaction term between CreditScoring*Post and a dummy equal to one if the loan is below the median of the size distribution of loans. The coecient of the interaction term is not statistically signicant. Columns 2 and 3 show sample splits across the median loan size. Interestingly, the coecient of CreditScoring*Post is negative and statistically signicant only in the subsample of smaller loans. This is consistent with the idea that SBCS is more eective for smaller rms, for which collecting information is dicult and costly. The adoption of credit scoring reduces the cost of obtaining information on these borrowers, resulting in lower defaults. In column 4 we test the possibility that the eect of SBCS on small loans is especially strong when a large bank adopts SBCS; in fact, since larger banks may be less equipped in gathering and processing soft information, SBCS may be especially eective for this class of banks, in particular when dealing with loans of small size. Our results, though, do not support this hypothesis.
Overall, these ndings indicate that the eect of the adoption of SBCS is homogeneous across banks. It is instead stronger in reducing the probability of ex-post default on smaller borrowers.
The Channels
In this section we provide evidence about the channels through which SBCS adoption aects the probability of accepting a loan application (in general and from riskier borrowers) and the probability that a loan defaults. These channels are related to the dierent uses of SBCS and to its importance in the lending process. In particular, we focus on two dierent uses of SBCS, for the decision of granting a loan to a rm (screening) and to monitor borrowers (monitoring), and on the degree of SBCS complementarity with respect to other lending technologies (rules vs. discretion).
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We exploit information contained in the Bank of Italy survey on the adoption of SBCS to identify banks that use SBCS mainly as a tool to screen borrowers or mainly as a tool to monitor them.
20 Results are shown in Table 11 . It can be seen that there is no evidence of heterogeneous eects of SBCS on the probability of accepting a loan application across banks that use SBCS mainly for screening or monitoring. By contrast, the eect of SBCS on the probability a loan defaults is stronger for banks that use SBCS mainly as a tool to monitor borrowers.
This result suggests that SBCS is a more eective tool in monitoring existing borrowers, than to screen new clients. In fact, the adoption of a lending technology which is characterized by the processing of hard information and which attributes a key role to the credit history of borrowers facilitates and makes the monitoring process more eective.
Finally, results (available upon request) show that the eect of SBCS does not dier across banks which use SBCS as the main factor supporting the decision of granting credit (rules banks) or as a complement with respect to other evaluation factors (discretion banks).
6 Conclusions
How does the adoption and use of credit scoring aect bank lending to small business? The widespread diusion of credit scoring technologies across banks during the last twenty years and the increased relevance of the assessment of borrowers' creditworthiness after the global nancial crisis make this question crucial for policy purposes.
Our paper sheds light on this important issue assessing the impact of SBCS on the propensity of banks to grant credit, on the selection of borrowers and on the probability that a borrower defaults on its loan. Our ndings show that the adoption of SBCS does not lead banks to relax 19 SBCS can also be used to determine interest rates. According to the results of the survey this usage is quite rare among the banks in our sample (see par. 2). Results, available from the authors, conrm that the adoption of SBCS has no eect on the distribution of interest rates charged. 21 This information is also derived from a specic question of the survey. In particular, banks are asked to make a ranking out of 7 specic evaluation factors reported in the questionnaire (see Appendix for details): the assessment of credit scoring as a decisive or very important factor in the lending process identies the rules banks.
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credit standards: rst, the propensity to grant loans to the generality of borrowers is not aected by the adoption of SBCS; second, banks are less willing to grant loans to riskier borrowers. The eect on credit performance is positive: SBCS reduces the probability that a loan defaults, and the eect is stronger for the banks using SBCS mainly as a tool for monitoring borrowers and for smaller borrowers.
Our ndings bear several important implications. From a theoretical perspective they indicate that the process of hardening of soft information in lending associated to the advances in communication technology involves mainly advantages for banks, facilitating the decision process about granting credit and the monitoring of borrowers' creditworthiness. From a policy perspective, the Basel II regulatory framework allowed the possibility for banks to rely on internal models of borrower rating to compute their capital ratios. The new, stricter, Basel III capital requirements and the adoption of stress tests for the assessment of the capacity of banks' balance sheet to bear adverse macroeconomic scenarios have further spurred banks to improve their credit scoring techniques. Yet, some of the early empirical evidence on the consequences of the adoption of credit scoring showed that it would imply a reduction in the costs associated to lending, but also a lower accuracy in the assessment of clients' creditworthiness, with negative consequences on credit quality. Taking for granted the decrease in the costs of the lending activity allowed by the use of credit scoring techniques, the results of our paper suggest that the concerns on the potential unintended consequences of the adoption of credit scoring may be overstated, and that actually the adoption of credit scoring leads to an increase in credit quality with an overall positive impact on the performance of banks.
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Figures Figure 29 Tables   Table 1: Mean of the dependent variables by adopters/non adopters and period
The table shows the average of the dependent variables used in the regression analysis in the pre-adoption period (years 1999, 2000, 2001) and in the post adoption period (2004, 2005, 2006) B the sample of non-adopters (126 banks, but for 9 banks we do not observe balance sheet information as of December 1998). Size is the log of total assets, capratio is the regulatory capital ratio, roa is return on assets, measured as prots divided by total assets, herndahl deposit is the herndahl index of deposits in the province where the rm is located, the average share of loans in the same industry is the average share of loans that the banks grant to rms in the same 2-digit ATECO industry. 1999, 2000, 2001 . The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. Columns 1 and 2 include year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects; columns 3 and 4 include province*year xed eects; columns 5 and 6 include bank-level controls as described in Table 1 . The sample includes loan applications by small rms recorded in the Credit
Register. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 6 : Eect on credit quality
The table shows 2SLS regressions of D(Bad Loan), the probability that a new loan made in year t to a rm rst recorded in the Credit Register defaults within the following 3 years (see Table 1 The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. Column 1 includes year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects; column 2 includes loan-level and rm-level controls measured at the beginning of the relationship: the log of the size of the loan, a dummy D(securitize) equal to 1 if the loan was securitized within 3 years from origination, and the number of borrower's bank relationships (some rms get loans from more than one bank in the rst year in which they enter the credit register), all measured as of the start of the relationship; column 3 includes province*year xed eects; column 4 includes bank-level controls as described in Table 1 . The sample includes loans made to small rms rst recorded in the Credit Register. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 7 : Overlapping sample
The table shows 2SLS regressions of the dummies for the acceptance of loan applications D(Accept) and for the probability a rm enters into default within 3 years from the loan origination, D(Bad Loan), on the dummy Credit Scoring interacted with the dummy Post (dened in the previous tables). The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. Regressions are run on the sample of bank-rm relationships of rms applying for credit for the rst time; in the case of the regression of D(Bad loan) on the subsample of those rms whose loan application was granted. All regressions include year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 8 : Bank heterogeneity -Acceptance
The table shows 2SLS regressions of the dummies for the acceptance of loan applications D(Accept) and D(Accept risk), on the dummy Credit Scoring interacted with the dummy Post (dened in the previous tables) and with dummies for bank characteristics. The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. Small size, Low Capratio, Low Roa equal 1 if bank assets, capital ratio and Roa, respectively, are in the bottom quartile of the distribution. High Herf Deposits equals 1 if the Herndahl index of deposits in the province where the borrower is located is above the median. High share of loans in the industry equals one if the share of loans to the industry the rm belongs to is above the median. Each distribution is computed in the reference year. All regressions include year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Credit Scoring * Post Table 9 : Bank heterogeneity -Credit quality
The table shows 2SLS regressions of the dummy for the probability a rm enters into default within 3 years from the loan origination, D(Bad Loan), on the dummy Credit Scoring interacted with the dummy Post (dened in the previous tables) and with dummies for bank characteristics. The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. Small size, Low Capratio, Low Roa equal 1 if bank assets, capital ratio and Roa, respectively, are in the bottom quartile of the distribution. High Herf Deposits equals 1 if the Herndahl index of deposits in the province where the borrower is located is above the median. High share of loans in the industry equals one if the share of loans to the industry the rm belongs to is above the median. Each distribution is computed in the reference year. All regressions include year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Credit Scoring*Post Table 11 : Channels: screening vs monitoring
The table shows 2SLS regressions of the dummies for the acceptance of loan applications D(Accept) and D(Accept risk) and for the probability a rm enters into default within 3 years from the loan origination, D(Bad Loan), on the dummy Credit Scoring interacted with the dummy Post (dened in the previous tables) and with dummies which represent the main use of credit scoring techniques by banks. The dummy Credit Scoring is instrumented using a dummy equal to 1 if the bank adopted credit scoring for household loans two years earlier or more. The dummy Screening equals 1 if the bank reports using credit scoring mainly as a screening tool, zero otherwise. The dummy Monitoring equals 1 if the bank reports using credit scoring mainly as a tool to monitor borrowers after the credit relationship is in place, zero otherwise. All regressions include year and bank xed eects, and borrower industry, province, and size class xed eects. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 B1 -In assessing creditworthiness, do you use automatic scores generated by statistical/quantitative methodologies (credit scoring and internal ratings)? Please indicate whether these methods are used for the types of lending listed below, the year they were introduced, whether they were developed internally or purchased from outside, and their importance in the decision whether or not to lend, amount, pricing, maturity, collateral and monitoring.
Yes / No
Year of introductio n (1)
Importance of the method in decisions on:
Amou nt (3) Pricing (3) Maturity (3) Collat eral
Monitorin g
Loans to households B3 -For the granting of loans to non-financial firms that apply to you for the first time, please rank in decreasing order of importance the factors used in deciding whether or not to grant the loan. 1 for the most important, 2 for the next most important, and so on. No two factors can be given the same rank. If you do not use the factor, answer NA.
SMEs Large firms
Statistical-quantitative methods exclusively Financial statement data (1) Credit relations with entire system (data from Central Credit Register and/or other credit bureaus or public sources, i.e. Interbank register of bad cheques and payment cards, Bulletin of protests, etc. (1) Availability of personal guarantees or collateral Qualitative information (organizational structure of firm, characteristics of project, etc.) (1) Other assessments based on first-hand information
Other (specify) 
